Unveil the Crazy Truth Behind the ADL Mechanism - Don't Let Exchanges Easily Take Your Money

By: blockbeats|2025/05/01 15:35:41
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Original Article Title: Auto-Deleveraging (ADL) Wrap-Up
Original Author: @ltrd_
Original Article Translation: zhouzhou, BlockBeats

Editor's Note: This article explains the Auto-Deleveraging (ADL) mechanism in the cryptocurrency market, particularly illustrating how ADL works by forcibly closing the positions of profitable clients to cover losses in times of insufficient market liquidation, using the example of $MANEKI. The article mentions that the execution of ADL has many opacities, such as price discrepancies and delayed execution. The author points out that understanding liquidation and ADL mechanisms is crucial for a deeper understanding of the crypto market and encourages readers to provide feedback for improvement.

Below is the original content (reorganized for better comprehension):

Today, I want to write a summary of the Auto-Deleveraging (ADL) mechanism in the cryptocurrency market. I am writing this article because I have recently received many messages about ADL and issues with this mechanism on various exchanges.

Furthermore, ADL is solely related to the crypto market—this is not something you would see in traditional financial markets (please correct me if I'm wrong). My goal today is to briefly explain what ADL is, what issues it faces, and why Bybit (and possibly not just this exchange) has raised many doubts about the ADL mechanism, as not everything is crystal clear.

Let me first explain what ADL is.

Currently, there is no clear, comprehensive whitepaper explaining how ADL works, the lack of clear examples, possible solutions, and plans for the development of this mechanism.

A friend recently provided me with the ADL data for MANEKI on the Bybit futures platform. I will slightly modify some numbers (without changing the range and percentage changes) to protect their anonymity.

Auto-Deleveraging is a mechanism that closes the most profitable position (i.e., the position opened with the highest leverage) when the exchange cannot continue to liquidate other clients' positions without facing losses.

Let me explain this more clearly, in case the previous explanation was not clear enough. Suppose there is a significant market fluctuation, with a sharp price drop leading to the forced liquidation of many clients' accounts. At this point, market liquidity worsens, and the market impact grows.

Let's assume we are at a specific moment where only one client is being liquidated. Let's say this client's position in $MANEKI is worth $50,000. For such a position, if you don't want to be liquidated, your account needs to maintain $2,500 (as the maintenance margin rate for this position is 5%).

If your 'Account Value' falls below $2,500, then your position will be liquidated — meaning, the maintenance margin is the cash you need to keep in your account to hold the position open.

Assuming the market continues to drop, and you incur significant losses on your open position, causing your account to drop below $2,500 — this would trigger an automatic liquidation process.

For this, let's assume some terms:

Liquidation Price → The price of $MANEKI at which your account is liquidated

Bankruptcy Price → The price of $MANEKI when your account value reaches 0 (if you are in a long position, this price should be strictly lower than the liquidation price, as at the liquidation price, your account should still have approximately the maintenance margin balance)

Execution Price → The market order price related to your account liquidation.

Your account is closed through a market order (sell), and the exchange gets the weighted average price of that order.

Here comes a very important point — if the Execution Price (EP) (assuming you are in a long position) is higher than the Bankruptcy Price (BP), theoretically, your account value should not be equal to 0 (because only when liquidation happens at BP, the account value would be equal to 0). However — you will not receive this additional amount — this is taken by the exchange.

If the exchange can execute the order at a better price than BP, it will take this surplus (and — as per the documentation — possibly contribute it to an insurance fund).

We'll come back to this issue later, but for now, let's focus on a more complex scenario:

Let's assume the market is volatile, and the exchange cannot execute orders at a price better than BP. In this case, the 'Account Value' would fall below 0, and the exchange would use the insurance fund to cover the losses.

The insurance fund is a "reserve pool that the system can use to protect traders from excessive losses in derivative trading."

Therefore, any liquidation orders below the bankruptcy price would result in additional losses, and the insurance fund would be used to cover these losses — this fund is typically composed of the exchange's funds or additional profits collected during settlement.

This is the ADL mechanism we ultimately want to discuss—if the insurance fund cannot cover the loss (because there is no money in it), the exchange will trigger an automatic deleveraging mechanism to fill this gap.

I want to define it as accurately and clearly as possible: ADL allows the exchange to offset the liquidation loss with the position of a profitable client.

So, if a client's position is liquidated, and the insurance fund cannot absorb the loss, the exchange will find a profitable client and forcibly close a portion of that client's profitable position to cover the loss.

Let's say the exchange needs to liquidate a $30,000 position: the insurance fund cannot cover the loss, so the exchange ranks clients based on the formula: Profit × Leverage. Assuming the top-ranked client holds a $100,000 position, the exchange will automatically close a $30,000 portion of that profitable position.

No liquidation order is placed in the market—this does not affect the order book, and the entire impact is silently absorbed by the profitable client with no warning.

It sounds a bit crazy—but that's basically how it operates.

You could say it's a kind of "excessive profit protection" mechanism created by the exchange.

I guess you should now understand this mechanism (I really hope so—I always try to explain slightly complex things in a simple way). Now we can start discussing some of my concerns and issues with this mechanism.

What's Weird About ADL?

First, the issue is that we know very little about the ADL mechanism. For example, we don't know when the exchange decides it cannot correctly execute a liquidation order and must resort to the ADL mechanism. This situation could happen at any time, and with no explanation.

For instance, Carol Alexander has a great article discussing the insurance fund and some volatile events.

There's a very peculiar point: on May 19, 2021 (a date that anyone serious about crypto trading in 2021 should know—if you don't, I suggest you make a cup of tea and spend at least an hour looking at that day's data), there was a massive sell-off and liquidation event.

However, when we look at Binance Futures' Insurance Fund data, we found that the Insurance Fund actually grew larger that day—it was not depleted!

I know it should have been cleared out because I personally got ADL'd on many contracts—clearly, the mechanism was flawed. I highly recommend you to read this article.

Let me go back to the decision between ADL and market sell order. On market sell orders and potential slippage: during the massive ADL event of $MANEKI (I assume it was significant as I know many got liquidated over the past few days), the cost of turnaround for a $50,000 order (i.e., the cost of doing a simultaneous buy and sell market order) did not significantly increase compared to before the large-scale liquidation event.

Remember: for a $50,000 order, the maintenance margin rate was 5%—even during a large swing period, the turnaround cost (not just the one-sided cost) was lower than this.

For larger positions (hence potentially causing more market impact), you would have a higher maintenance margin rate anyway.

Unveil the Crazy Truth Behind the ADL Mechanism - Don't Let Exchanges Easily Take Your Money

Next, a really crazy part is the difference between the mark price (assuming this is the price in the market at some moment) and the ADL price.

In my friend's case, his ADL price was around 0.0033, but the mark price (i.e., the actual market price) at the time of ADL was 0.002595—a significant difference.

Even crazier is—the price of 0.0033 had been absent from the market for over 30 minutes at the time of ADL.

Why didn't the exchange trigger ADL right after the liquidation of other clients at a price of 0.0033? Why did they wait for 30 minutes to execute it?

A trade that was initially profitable turned into a 30% loss at the time of ADL. Since we have no information on historical ADL or its mechanics, the exchange can essentially act arbitrarily.

I tried to verify with others if there were similar price disparities and crazy ADL situations—and yes, I found corroborated individuals. But the story doesn't end there. Prior to these bizarre events happening, the Insurance Fund had already been empty for several days.

I previously mentioned the story from April 24th, but as you can clearly see, the Insurance Fund has been nearly depleted since April 19th—and Bybit did nothing about it.

They could have done many things: adjusted the maintenance margin, added funds to the insurance fund, introduced better protection measures for customers.

But they did nothing.

A significant sell-off (over 40%) occurred the day before Bybit announced the delisting of $MANEKI.
For the curious, I have provided a chart from a few days before the sell-off showing the craziness, absurdity, and manipulation. But from Bybit's perspective, no one paid any attention to it.

Through this crazy example of $MANEKI, I hope to explain to you a little about what ADL is.

I think understanding the liquidation process, the ADL mechanism, and all the aspects related to perpetual contracts and margin is crucial to fully understanding the cryptocurrency market.

Original Article Link

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China's Central Bank and Eight Other Departments' Latest Regulatory Focus: Key Attention to RWA Tokenized Asset Risk


Foreword: Today, the People's Bank of China's website published the "Notice of the People's Bank of China, National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, Ministry of Public Security, State Administration for Market Regulation, China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, China Securities Regulatory Commission, State Administration of Foreign Exchange on Further Preventing and Dealing with Risks Related to Virtual Currency and Others (Yinfa [2026] No. 42)", the latest regulatory requirements from the eight departments including the central bank, which are basically consistent with the regulatory requirements of recent years. The main focus of the regulation is on speculative activities such as virtual currency trading, exchanges, ICOs, overseas platform services, and this time, regulatory oversight of RWA has been added, explicitly prohibiting RWA tokenization, stablecoins (especially those pegged to the RMB). The following is the full text:


To the people's governments of all provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under the Central Government, the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps:


  Recently, there have been speculative activities related to virtual currency and Real-World Assets (RWA) tokenization, disrupting the economic and financial order and jeopardizing the property security of the people. In order to further prevent and address the risks related to virtual currency and Real-World Assets tokenization, effectively safeguard national security and social stability, in accordance with the "Law of the People's Republic of China on the People's Bank of China," "Law of the People's Republic of China on Commercial Banks," "Securities Law of the People's Republic of China," "Law of the People's Republic of China on Securities Investment Funds," "Law of the People's Republic of China on Futures and Derivatives," "Cybersecurity Law of the People's Republic of China," "Regulations of the People's Republic of China on the Administration of Renminbi," "Regulations on Prevention and Disposal of Illegal Fundraising," "Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Foreign Exchange Administration," "Telecommunications Regulations of the People's Republic of China," and other provisions, after reaching consensus with the Cyberspace Administration of China, the Supreme People's Court, and the Supreme People's Procuratorate, and with the approval of the State Council, the relevant matters are notified as follows:


  I. Clarify the essential attributes of virtual currency, Real-World Assets tokenization, and related business activities


  (I) Virtual currency does not possess the legal status equivalent to fiat currency. Virtual currencies such as Bitcoin, Ether, Tether, etc., have the main characteristics of being issued by non-monetary authorities, using encryption technology and distributed ledger or similar technology, existing in digital form, etc. They do not have legal tender status, should not and cannot be circulated and used as currency in the market.


  The business activities related to virtual currency are classified as illegal financial activities. The exchange of fiat currency and virtual currency within the territory, exchange of virtual currencies, acting as a central counterparty in buying and selling virtual currencies, providing information intermediary and pricing services for virtual currency transactions, token issuance financing, and trading of virtual currency-related financial products, etc., fall under illegal financial activities, such as suspected illegal issuance of token vouchers, unauthorized public issuance of securities, illegal operation of securities and futures business, illegal fundraising, etc., are strictly prohibited across the board and resolutely banned in accordance with the law. Overseas entities and individuals are not allowed to provide virtual currency-related services to domestic entities in any form.


  A stablecoin pegged to a fiat currency indirectly fulfills some functions of the fiat currency in circulation. Without the consent of relevant authorities in accordance with the law and regulations, any domestic or foreign entity or individual is not allowed to issue a RMB-pegged stablecoin overseas.


(II)Tokenization of Real-World Assets refers to the use of encryption technology and distributed ledger or similar technologies to transform ownership rights, income rights, etc., of assets into tokens (tokens) or other interests or bond certificates with token (token) characteristics, and carry out issuance and trading activities.


  Engaging in the tokenization of real-world assets domestically, as well as providing related intermediary, information technology services, etc., which are suspected of illegal issuance of token vouchers, unauthorized public offering of securities, illegal operation of securities and futures business, illegal fundraising, and other illegal financial activities, shall be prohibited; except for relevant business activities carried out with the approval of the competent authorities in accordance with the law and regulations and relying on specific financial infrastructures. Overseas entities and individuals are not allowed to illegally provide services related to the tokenization of real-world assets to domestic entities in any form.


  II. Sound Work Mechanism


  (III) Inter-agency Coordination. The People's Bank of China, together with the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the Ministry of Public Security, the State Administration for Market Regulation, the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, the China Securities Regulatory Commission, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, and other departments, will improve the work mechanism, strengthen coordination with the Cyberspace Administration of China, the Supreme People's Court, and the Supreme People's Procuratorate, coordinate efforts, and overall guide regions to carry out risk prevention and disposal of virtual currency-related illegal financial activities.


  The China Securities Regulatory Commission, together with the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the Ministry of Public Security, the People's Bank of China, the State Administration for Market Regulation, the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, and other departments, will improve the work mechanism, strengthen coordination with the Cyberspace Administration of China, the Supreme People's Court, and the Supreme People's Procuratorate, coordinate efforts, and overall guide regions to carry out risk prevention and disposal of illegal financial activities related to the tokenization of real-world assets.


  (IV) Strengthening Local Implementation. The people's governments at the provincial level are overall responsible for the prevention and disposal of risks related to virtual currencies and the tokenization of real-world assets in their respective administrative regions. The specific leading department is the local financial regulatory department, with participation from branches and dispatched institutions of the State Council's financial regulatory department, telecommunications regulators, public security, market supervision, and other departments, in coordination with cyberspace departments, courts, and procuratorates, to improve the normalization of the work mechanism, effectively connect with the relevant work mechanisms of central departments, form a cooperative and coordinated working pattern between central and local governments, effectively prevent and properly handle risks related to virtual currencies and the tokenization of real-world assets, and maintain economic and financial order and social stability.


  III. Strengthened Risk Monitoring, Prevention, and Disposal


  (5) Enhanced Risk Monitoring. The People's Bank of China, China Securities Regulatory Commission, National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, Ministry of Public Security, State Administration of Foreign Exchange, Cyberspace Administration of China, and other departments continue to improve monitoring techniques and system support, enhance cross-departmental data analysis and sharing, establish sound information sharing and cross-validation mechanisms, promptly grasp the risk situation of activities related to virtual currency and real-world asset tokenization. Local governments at all levels give full play to the role of local monitoring and early warning mechanisms. Local financial regulatory authorities, together with branches and agencies of the State Council's financial regulatory authorities, as well as departments of cyberspace and public security, ensure effective connection between online monitoring, offline investigation, and fund tracking, efficiently and accurately identify activities related to virtual currency and real-world asset tokenization, promptly share risk information, improve early warning information dissemination, verification, and rapid response mechanisms.


  (6) Strengthened Oversight of Financial Institutions, Intermediaries, and Technology Service Providers. Financial institutions (including non-bank payment institutions) are prohibited from providing account opening, fund transfer, and clearing services for virtual currency-related business activities, issuing and selling financial products related to virtual currency, including virtual currency and related financial products in the scope of collateral, conducting insurance business related to virtual currency, or including virtual currency in the scope of insurance liability. Financial institutions (including non-bank payment institutions) are prohibited from providing custody, clearing, and settlement services for unauthorized real-world asset tokenization-related business and related financial products. Relevant intermediary institutions and information technology service providers are prohibited from providing intermediary, technical, or other services for unauthorized real-world asset tokenization-related businesses and related financial products.


  (7) Enhanced Management of Internet Information Content and Access. Internet enterprises are prohibited from providing online business venues, commercial displays, marketing, advertising, or paid traffic diversion services for virtual currency and real-world asset tokenization-related business activities. Upon discovering clues of illegal activities, they should promptly report to relevant departments and provide technical support and assistance for related investigations and inquiries. Based on the clues transferred by the financial regulatory authorities, the cyberspace administration, telecommunications authorities, and public security departments should promptly close and deal with websites, mobile applications (including mini-programs), and public accounts engaged in virtual currency and real-world asset tokenization-related business activities in accordance with the law.


  (8) Strengthened Entity Registration and Advertisement Management. Market supervision departments strengthen entity registration and management, and enterprise and individual business registrations must not contain terms such as "virtual currency," "virtual asset," "cryptocurrency," "crypto asset," "stablecoin," "real-world asset tokenization," or "RWA" in their names or business scopes. Market supervision departments, together with financial regulatory authorities, legally enhance the supervision of advertisements related to virtual currency and real-world asset tokenization, promptly investigating and handling relevant illegal advertisements.


  (IX) Continued Rectification of Virtual Currency Mining Activities. The National Development and Reform Commission, together with relevant departments, strictly controls virtual currency mining activities, continuously promotes the rectification of virtual currency mining activities. The people's governments of various provinces take overall responsibility for the rectification of "mining" within their respective administrative regions. In accordance with the requirements of the National Development and Reform Commission and other departments in the "Notice on the Rectification of Virtual Currency Mining Activities" (NDRC Energy-saving Building [2021] No. 1283) and the provisions of the "Guidance Catalog for Industrial Structure Adjustment (2024 Edition)," a comprehensive review, investigation, and closure of existing virtual currency mining projects are conducted, new mining projects are strictly prohibited, and mining machine production enterprises are strictly prohibited from providing mining machine sales and other services within the country.


  (X) Severe Crackdown on Related Illegal Financial Activities. Upon discovering clues to illegal financial activities related to virtual currency and the tokenization of real-world assets, local financial regulatory authorities, branches of the State Council's financial regulatory authorities, and other relevant departments promptly investigate, determine, and properly handle the issues in accordance with the law, and seriously hold the relevant entities and individuals legally responsible. Those suspected of crimes are transferred to the judicial authorities for processing according to the law.


 (XI) Severe Crackdown on Related Illegal and Criminal Activities. The Ministry of Public Security, the People's Bank of China, the State Administration for Market Regulation, the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, the China Securities Regulatory Commission, as well as judicial and procuratorial organs, in accordance with their respective responsibilities, rigorously crack down on illegal and criminal activities related to virtual currency, the tokenization of real-world assets, such as fraud, money laundering, illegal business operations, pyramid schemes, illegal fundraising, and other illegal and criminal activities carried out under the guise of virtual currency, the tokenization of real-world assets, etc.


  (XII) Strengthen Industry Self-discipline. Relevant industry associations should enhance membership management and policy advocacy, based on their own responsibilities, advocate and urge member units to resist illegal financial activities related to virtual currency and the tokenization of real-world assets. Member units that violate regulatory policies and industry self-discipline rules are to be disciplined in accordance with relevant self-regulatory management regulations. By leveraging various industry infrastructure, conduct risk monitoring related to virtual currency, the tokenization of real-world assets, and promptly transfer issue clues to relevant departments.


  IV. Strict Supervision of Domestic Entities Engaging in Overseas Business Activities


(XIII) Without the approval of relevant departments in accordance with the law and regulations, domestic entities and foreign entities controlled by them may not issue virtual currency overseas.


  (XIV) Domestic entities engaging directly or indirectly in overseas external debt-based tokenization of real-world assets, or conducting asset securitization activities abroad based on domestic ownership rights, income rights, etc. (hereinafter referred to as domestic equity), should be strictly regulated in accordance with the principles of "same business, same risk, same rules." The National Development and Reform Commission, the China Securities Regulatory Commission, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, and other relevant departments regulate it according to their respective responsibilities. For other forms of overseas real-world asset tokenization activities based on domestic equity by domestic entities, the China Securities Regulatory Commission, together with relevant departments, supervise according to their division of responsibilities. Without the consent and filing of relevant departments, no unit or individual may engage in the above-mentioned business.


  (15) Overseas subsidiaries and branches of domestic financial institutions providing Real World Asset Tokenization-related services overseas shall do so legally and prudently. They shall have professional personnel and systems in place to effectively mitigate business risks, strictly implement customer onboarding, suitability management, anti-money laundering requirements, and incorporate them into the domestic financial institutions' compliance and risk management system. Intermediaries and information technology service providers offering Real World Asset Tokenization services abroad based on domestic equity or conducting Real World Asset Tokenization business in the form of overseas debt for domestic entities directly or indirectly venturing abroad must strictly comply with relevant laws and regulations. They should establish and improve relevant compliance and internal control systems in accordance with relevant normative requirements, strengthen business and risk control, and report the business developments to the relevant regulatory authorities for approval or filing.


  V. Strengthen Organizational Implementation


  (16) Strengthen organizational leadership and overall coordination. All departments and regions should attach great importance to the prevention of risks related to virtual currencies and Real World Asset Tokenization, strengthen organizational leadership, clarify work responsibilities, form a long-term effective working mechanism with centralized coordination, local implementation, and shared responsibilities, maintain high pressure, dynamically monitor risks, effectively prevent and mitigate risks in an orderly and efficient manner, legally protect the property security of the people, and make every effort to maintain economic and financial order and social stability.


  (17) Widely carry out publicity and education. All departments, regions, and industry associations should make full use of various media and other communication channels to disseminate information through legal and policy interpretation, analysis of typical cases, and education on investment risks, etc. They should promote the illegality and harm of virtual currencies and Real World Asset Tokenization-related businesses and their manifestations, fully alert to potential risks and hidden dangers, and enhance public awareness and identification capabilities for risk prevention.


  VI. Legal Responsibility


  (18) Engaging in illegal financial activities related to virtual currencies and Real World Asset Tokenization in violation of this notice, as well as providing services for virtual currencies and Real World Asset Tokenization-related businesses, shall be punished in accordance with relevant regulations. If it constitutes a crime, criminal liability shall be pursued according to the law. For domestic entities and individuals who knowingly or should have known that overseas entities illegally provided virtual currency or Real World Asset Tokenization-related services to domestic entities and still assisted them, relevant responsibilities shall be pursued according to the law. If it constitutes a crime, criminal liability shall be pursued according to the law.


  (19) If any unit or individual invests in virtual currencies, Real World Asset Tokens, and related financial products against public order and good customs, the relevant civil legal actions shall be invalid, and any resulting losses shall be borne by them. If there are suspicions of disrupting financial order and jeopardizing financial security, the relevant departments shall deal with them according to the law.


  This notice shall enter into force upon the date of its issuance. The People's Bank of China and ten other departments' "Notice on Further Preventing and Dealing with the Risks of Virtual Currency Trading Speculation" (Yinfa [2021] No. 237) is hereby repealed.


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